Part I
Political and Military Forces in Iranian Kurdistan (Rojhelat)
Atlas
March 6, 2026
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War led to the partition of Kurdistan into four parts. Iranian Kurdistan, like regions in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, was incorporated into the orbit of newly formed capitalist nation-states. This era was characterized by the systematic denial of ethnic identities, political repression, and various forms of national oppression.
Historical documents show that the secret Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916) between Britain, France, and Tsarist Russia, and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) that followed, consciously ignored the Kurdish question. This “fourfold partition” was not a solution to a historical problem but was instead an attempt to deny and erase the Kurdish question itself. The natural response to these conditions was a struggle against national oppression, which transformed the “right to self-determination” into the central tenet of political movements throughout Kurdistan.
The British Project of a “Centralized Military State”
The developments of twentieth-century Iran were shaped by external state-building projects. After the February 1921 coup and the rise of Reza Khan, who was a Cossack officer, Britain advanced the consolidation of centralized state power by recognizing his authoritarian and militaristic potential. General Edmund Ironside, the commander of British forces in Iran, played a decisive role in guiding Reza Khan’s military ascent.
The strategy behind this policy was to create a national army and a centralized bureaucracy to secure imperial interests and contain Bolshevik influence. This process came at the expense of suppressing ethnic communities, including Kurds, Azerbaijanis, Sistan-Baluchis, Turkmens, and Arabs. With the proclamation of Reza Khan as king in 1925, which was supported by the Qom clergy under the doctrine that “the Shah is the shadow of God,” policies of cultural homogenization and structural marginalization in peripheral regions became institutionalized.
The Consolidation of Security Dictatorship
The second major turning point in the suppression of democracy and national rights was the 1953 coup against the national government of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh. This coup, organized with the direct involvement of the United States (CIA) and British (MI6) intelligence services, consolidated the authoritarian rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. If the coup had failed and the Shah had been removed, the later rise of Khomeinism would likely not have been possible.
The coup was carried out under the military leadership of General Fazlollah Zahedi, who relied on hired street mobs and received political support from segments of the clergy. This included networks associated with Behbahani and Kashani, both of whom benefited from substantial financial backing. The result was a political deadlock that reinforced authoritarian rule.
A strategic consequence of this process was the intensification of security control in border and ethnic regions. The ethnic groups of Iran were not only deprived of political participation but were also relegated to a center-periphery order where their share of development became structural underdevelopment. Class oppression rooted in dependent, oil-based comprador capitalism merged with national oppression. This produced a form of internal colonialism characterized by the extraction of natural resources and the destruction of local ecosystems.
Administrative Divisions after the Rise of Political Islam in 1979
Central governments have historically attempted to weaken Kurdish regions through geographical fragmentation. After the 1979 revolution, the security logic of administrative divisions continued. Kurdish society was dispersed across four provinces:
Kurdistan Province
West Azerbaijan Province
Kermanshah Province
Ilam Province
This fragmentation prevented the formation of a unified administrative-political unit capable of advancing broad national demands. The presence of large Kurdish populations in northern Khorasan, specifically in Quchan, Shirvan, and surrounding areas, was also the result of forced relocations during earlier historical periods, particularly under the Safavid dynasty and Nader Shah Afshar.
These relocations aimed to use Kurds as a human defensive buffer along the borders while keeping them under the authority of local tribal chiefs and feudal lords. The underlying goal of this policy was to separate Kurds from their homeland and gradually assimilate them into the constructed identity of the Iranian nation.
Kurdish Political Parties in Iran
At present, Kurdish political organizations in Iran can broadly be categorized into three main tendencies:
Nationalist / independence-seeking currents
Autonomy-oriented or federalist movements
Leftist socialist movements—generally supporting the right of peoples to self-determination and advocating solidarity among the peoples of Iran and the region, often with a council-based (communal) orientation.
Many of these parties became active following the 1979 revolution, and several of them are currently based in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
Komala
Komala appeared in the late 1970s from networks of Kurdish student circles and leftist activists influenced by socialist ideas. From the outset, the organization sought to frame the Kurdish national question in connection with class struggle and the social emancipation of the working classes.
In the revolutionary atmosphere of 1979, these political networks established lasting ties with workers, artisans, and the urban and rural poor. Following the collapse of the monarchy, the organization publicly announced its existence in the winter of 1979 under the name Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan, or Komala, and quickly became one of the decisive political forces in Kurdistan.
During the early years following the revolution, Komala played a dual role. On one hand, it helped organize popular structures and local councils; on the other, it organized Peshmerga forces to defend areas under its influence. In Sanandaj, neighborhood councils known as Bankehs became some of the earliest examples of council-based grassroots organizations established after the revolution.
Only a few months after the rise of political Islam to power, in August 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a decree of jihad against Kurdistan, accompanied by widespread massacres. This marked the beginning of a new phase of popular resistance. Military operations by the army, revolutionary committees, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps intensified in order to recapture Kurdish cities and suppress political organizations. Under these conditions, Komala organized Peshmerga forces and resisted the offensive, maintaining control over several towns and many rural areas for months.
Kurdistan during this period also became a refuge and stronghold for radical political forces opposed to the government, forces that were being severely repressed in other parts of Iran. The eight-year war between the governments of Iran and Iraq also served as a mechanism to suppress and contain social movements, including women’s, student, and workers’ movements, as well as the struggles of the people across Iran, particularly in Kurdistan.
Komala’s activities were not limited to military resistance. The organization also played an important role in the formation of social institutions. Among these initiatives was the establishment of the Peasants’ Union, founded by Fouad Mostafa Soltani and beginning in Marivan, later expanding to other areas. These unions played a significant role in confronting the remnants of the feudal landlord–peasant system and in organizing impoverished farmers.
At the same time, a network of councils and social organizations emerged in Kurdish cities. The active participation of women in the political and military structures of Komala was a notable characteristic of this period. Starting in the early 1980s, women not only participated in political activities but also joined the armed struggle within Peshmerga units.
The Formation of the Communist Party of Iran and Splits within Komala
On 2 September 1983, Komala, together with several political circles and activists who had split from other socialist organizations across Iran, founded the Communist Party of Iran. Within this framework, Komala continued its activities under the name “Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran”, while maintaining its own internal organizational structure. From 1983 onward, its forces were based in border areas and later in bases within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
The War between Komala and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (1984–1988)
One of the most tragic chapters in the modern history of Iranian Kurdistan was the armed conflict between Komala and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) during the mid-1980s. In September 1984, the KDPI’s central committee declared a full-scale war against Komala.
Within Komala’s leadership, there were differing views. A dominant faction interpreted the conflict as a struggle over political and class hegemony, while another tendency argued that the primary focus should remain on the struggle against the Islamic Republic. Meanwhile, internal disputes within the KDPI also led to splits, producing factions known as the “Revolutionary Leadership” and the “Eighth Congress” group.
Eventually, in May 1988, Komala announced the end of the internal conflict, citing responsibility toward the Kurdish movement and the need to concentrate on the broader struggle against the Islamic Republic. This internal war left heavy consequences, including killings, deep social and political divisions, and waves of migration and dispersion among activists.
Split within the Communist Party of Iran – Komala
During the period of retreat and camp-based existence, internal disagreements within the Communist Party of Iran intensified. In November 1991, a group of party cadres formed a new organization called the Worker-Communist Party of Iran, while the remaining leadership continued under the same name, maintaining the Communist Party of Iran and its Kurdistan branch (Komala) in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
The Worker-Communist Party of Iran itself later experienced another split, leading to the formation of two separate parties:
• Worker-Communist Party of Iran – Hekmatist
• Hekmatist Party (Official Line)
Komala – Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan
From the late 2000s, disagreements over the assessment of Iran’s political situation, strategies of struggle, and the relationship between political activity, opposition alliances, and Peshmerga warfare led to the emergence of several factions using the historical name Komala. As a result, the name “Komala” became a shared legacy among multiple organizations with a common origin but divergent political paths.
Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan
With changes in the regional political environment and the establishment of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, strategic disagreements deepened. In 2000, a group of Komala leaders—including Abdullah Mohtadi, Omar Ilkhanizadeh, and Reza Kaabi—argued that the Communist Party’s framework no longer corresponded to the new political horizons in Iranian Kurdistan. They separated and established the Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan. In 2006, this organization adopted the name Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan and continued its activities with a social-democratic orientation.
Komala of Kurdistan Toilers
In 2008, following a violent internal dispute, another faction emerged under the name Komala of Kurdistan Toilers, led by Omar Ilkhanizadeh. After years of separate activity, this group joined the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan on 19 November 2022. However, the reunification proved short-lived. Disagreements resurfaced, and on 20 June 2023, a section of the cadres announced the failure of the unity process and declared the continuation of independent activity, appointing Reza Kaabi as secretary-general and Fariba Mohammadi as spokesperson.
Two Komalas and Two Communist Parties of Iran
Due to organizational and ideological disputes, another split occurred within the Communist Party of Iran in 2020, resulting in two separate parties with the same name. In both cases, the Kurdistan branch continued to operate under the historical name “Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran (Komala).”
On one side of this division stands the faction led by Ebrahim Alizadeh, who serves as Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Iran and leader of its Kurdistan organization. On the other side stands another Communist Party of Iran led by Salah Mazouji, whose Kurdistan branch also operates under the name Komala.
Both organizations currently maintain separate headquarters and bases in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. As a result, today, two parties, the Communist Party of Iran, and two organizations, Komala, exist within the political landscape of Iranian Kurdistan, each claiming to represent the legacy and historical tradition of the original Komala movement.
Council for Cooperation of Left and Communist Forces in Kurdistan
This council was established in 2022 at a conference in Stockholm to strengthen cooperation and coordination among communist and left-wing parties and activists in Kurdistan. Its declared objectives include supporting the struggles of workers, women, and other social movements in Kurdistan, as well as opposing the Islamic Republic.
The long-term horizon of this cooperation is the creation of a left and socialist alternative based on council democracy and popular self-management, transferring the administration of society to councils of workers, laborers, and ordinary people rather than party rule. The cooperation involves the Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran (Komala), the Kurdistan Committee of the Worker-Communist Party of Iran – Hekmatist, and a number of left- and communist-activists.
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)
The KDPI was founded in 1945, at the end of the Second World War, in the city of Mahabad under the leadership of Qazi Muhammad. The party emerged amid the presence of the Red Army in northern Iran and the establishment of the Azerbaijan People’s Government led by Ja’far Pishevari. With a Kurdish nationalist orientation, the party aimed to end national oppression against the Kurdish people.
During this period, the Republic of Kurdistan was proclaimed in Mahabad. However, following the withdrawal of the Soviet Red Army and the Shah’s military advance, both the Azerbaijani and Kurdish popular governments were left isolated. The central government seized this opportunity to crush both movements. As a result, Qazi Muhammad, Saif Qazi, and several leaders of the Mahabad Republic were executed by hanging in 1947 in Mahabad’s Chahar-Cheragh Square.
After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the KDPI entered a new and decisive phase under the leadership of Abdulrahman Ghassemlou, a prominent political figure and diplomat. The party adopted the strategic slogan “Democracy for Iran, Autonomy for Kurdistan.”
In 1989, during negotiations with representatives of the Islamic Republic in Vienna, Ghassemlou was assassinated. He had approached the negotiations with a peaceful outlook and optimism regarding the government’s promises of a political settlement, unaware that the talks had been organized as a trap. While secretly meeting with Iranian representatives—who were in fact a death squad—he was shot and killed in the negotiation room. The assassination delivered a severe shock to the party and the Kurdish movement.
After Ghassemlou’s death, the party reorganized under the leadership of Sadegh Sharafkandi. Sharafkandi was also assassinated by agents of the Islamic Republic in September 1992 at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin, while participating in a gathering of the Socialist International. The assassination led to one of the most historic judicial rulings in Europe, officially implicating senior Iranian officials—including Ali Khamenei—in extraterritorial political assassinations.
After approximately 16 years of internal division, the KDPI finally achieved reunification in summer 2022, when its two main factions merged into a single organization under the leadership of Mustafa Hijri. Today, the KDPI is one of the principal members of the Cooperation Center of Iranian Kurdistan Parties and part of the six-party coalition formed following the January 2026 PJAK initiative.
Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK)
The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) was founded in 2006 and has become one of the more militarily visible Kurdish organizations. Unlike the KDPI, which advocates autonomy within Iran, PAK openly calls for full independence and the creation of an independent Kurdish state, rejecting federal models for Iran as insufficient. The leader of the party is Hussein Yazdanpanah.
Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan
The Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan emerged with a national–religious orientation and, on 26 June 1980, entered the post-revolutionary political arena as a counterweight to the dominance of left currents and secular nationalist forces. It represented a response from a segment of the religious community that nevertheless drew a clear boundary against leftist worldviews, and it organized its forces under the slogan “Peshmerga and Muslim.” The organization’s founding role was primarily associated with Sheikh Jalal Hosseini; after him, leadership passed to his son Kak Baba Sheikh Hosseini. At the level of Iran’s opposition politics, Khabat has also maintained cooperation with the National Council of Resistance of Iran (Mojahedin-e Khalq).
part 2
PJAK and the Project of a Democratic Society in East Kurdistan
The Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê – PJAK) emerged within the political and social transformations experienced by a new generation of Kurdish activists in the late 1990s. This period coincided with intensified political repression in the region and significant shifts in the discourse of Kurdish movements. One of the decisive events in this process was the abduction and transfer of Abdullah Öcalan on February 15, 1999—an event described in the literature of Kurdish movements as a “global conspiracy,” which profoundly influenced the intellectual and organizational trajectory of the movement.
After Öcalan’s capture and the beginning of his imprisonment on Imrali Island, the Kurdish movement faced a theoretical and organizational vacuum. Under such conditions, a new generation of Kurdish political and social activists began to rethink the methods of struggle. This reconsideration gradually led to the formation of new intellectual circles that emphasized social self-organization, popular participation, and the central role of women in social transformation.
Within this context, PJAK officially announced its establishment in 2004 in the Qandil region. In its early phase, the organization’s political leadership was largely associated with the name Abdulrahman Haji Ahmadi. During its first years, PJAK focused mainly on consolidating its organizational structure and building social and political networks within Kurdish society in Iran. The armed clashes in 2011 between PJAK forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the mountainous areas of Kurdistan marked a turning point in the organization’s trajectory. Following this stage, the organization attempted—alongside its military activities—to strengthen its political position, train political cadres, and expand social organization.
From a theoretical perspective, PJAK considers itself part of a broader movement known in its political discourse as the Kurdistan Freedom Movement. Within this framework, PJAK is not viewed as a separate entity within this constellation but rather as one of its branches operating in Iran, and is intellectually and ideologically linked to the theory of Democratic Confederalism.
The concept of Democratic Confederalism, proposed by Öcalan, represents a model of political and social organization that stands in opposition to the classical nation-state paradigm. This theory emphasizes democratic self-administration of society, local councils, gender equality, cultural diversity, and a social economy, and seeks to offer an alternative to centralized power structures.
Within this framework, PJAK defines its political strategy through the concept known as the “Third Line.” This strategy seeks, on the one hand, to distance itself from the classical nationalism of older Kurdish parties, and on the other hand to avoid becoming an instrument of regional or international powers. The “Third Line” is based on the principle that political and social change must arise from the power of society and grassroots organization, rather than through dependence on states or external powers.
The Democratic Society of East Kurdistan (KODAR)
As the theoretical and organizational evolution of this current continued, a structure known as Komalgeyê Demokratîk û Azadê Rojhilatê Kurdistanê (KODAR)—the Democratic and Free Society of East Kurdistan—was formed. KODAR was established in 2014 during a congress in the Qandil region and introduced as a broader framework for organizing Kurdish society in Iran.
KODAR defines itself not as a political party nor as a party coalition, but as a democratic and non-state socio-political system aimed at organizing society according to the principles of Democratic Confederalism. In this model, the management of society is not carried out through the concentration of power in a party or a state, but through a network of councils and grassroots structures.
Within KODAR’s theoretical structure, society is organized from the lowest levels upward. Communes and local councils are regarded as the fundamental units of decision-making, through which citizens participate in managing social, cultural, economic, and political affairs. This model seeks to reject state centralism and instead develop a form of social governance based on the direct participation of the people.
One of the significant features of this structure is its emphasis on the cultural and social diversity of East Kurdistan. Within this framework, different religious, linguistic, and cultural communities can coexist within a shared democratic system. At the same time, women’s liberation is presented as one of the fundamental pillars of this model, and specific structures have been created for the autonomous organization of women.
Within this constellation, KODAR functions as a political and social umbrella, coordinating among civil institutions, popular councils, and various political structures. The goal of this system is to create a society in which political power is not monopolized by a single party or institution but is distributed across a network of social structures.
Recent Social Transformations in Iran
Social developments in Iran in recent years—particularly the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement—have highlighted several key concepts central to this discourse. The movement, which began in 2022 following the state killing of Jina (Mahsa) Amini, quickly became one of the most widespread waves of social protest in contemporary Iranian history.
For forces such as PJAK and structures such as KODAR, these developments represented a practical test of the ideas articulated in the theory of Democratic Confederalism, including women’s liberation, direct public participation in politics, and the council-based organization of society. The extensive presence of women in this movement and the articulation of democratic and social demands on a broad scale brought some elements of this discourse to the center of public attention.
From this perspective, PJAK and KODAR present a vision of social organization in which society is administered through networks of councils, grassroots institutions, and participatory structures, an approach that, according to its supporters, may provide a pathway for overcoming the political and social crises facing Iran and the wider region.
Free Women’s Society of East Kurdistan (KJAR – Komalên Jinên Azad a Rojhilatê Kurdistanê)
KJAR represents the highest organizational body for women within the constellation of Apoist thought in Iran and presents itself as an alternative paradigm and a “specialized parliament of women.” Its theoretical foundation is Jineology, which views the free human being in relation to women’s return to the center of social governance.
KJAR, as a confederal women’s structure, carries the specialized responsibility for half of society with full military, administrative, and ideological autonomy. According to documents issued in 2014—coinciding with the establishment of KODAR—the relationship between KJAR and PJAK is defined as “two parallel arms.” In addition to its independent decision-making authority, KJAR also possesses the right of veto in cases where women’s rights are at stake.
Among its institutional components are the Women’s Defense Forces (HPJ) as an independent armed branch of women, as well as civil and urban networks that address issues such as child marriage and »honour killings«. KJAR maintains that the intellectual foundations of the slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom” are the result of two decades of activism in the current period, and it seeks to guide the protests of 2022 toward a lasting transformation centered on women’s liberation.
The Dialectic of Organization and the Crisis of Hegemony in Iran
In the current turbulence of Iran’s history, we face a situation that Gramsci described as an “interregnum”: the old is dying, and the new has not yet been born. The collapse of the security and military centers of the Islamic capitalist state is no longer a hypothesis; it has become an objective reality.
Among Kurdish political forces, a strategic split has emerged over how to assess global power relations and manage international crises. Some currents—especially both Komalas (the CPI’s Kurdistan Organization)—argue that any reliance on external states and powers, particularly the United States, contradicts the principle of independent popular movements. In their view, the correct strategy is reliance on society’s own independent force and the internal organization of the masses, because dependence on global powers can turn popular movements into instruments of geopolitical bargaining and ultimately sacrifice the interests of peoples to shifting power balances.
In contrast, segments of other political forces argue that if this position is made absolute, it becomes a form of political isolationism—one that, in acute crises and uneven power balances, effectively clears the field for repressive actors. From this perspective, the issue is not an absolute avoidance of international relations, but rather how to make conscious and independent use of contradictions within the global power system.
Lessons from Rojava and the Great Revolutions
Historical experience shows that revolutionary movements have always taken shape and advanced amid global power contradictions. The essential question is this: if the People’s Defense Forces in Rojava had not possessed an accurate understanding of geopolitical fractures and exploited the “historical moments” produced by crises and conflicts within the imperial bloc, would the experience of democratic self-administration in that region exist today? If there had been no tactical utilization of international coalitions, would the death machine of ISIS have failed to swallow the entire region?
The revolutions of history convey the same lesson. In the workers’ revolution of 1917, if Lenin had not grasped the imperialist contradictions within the First World War and thereby found breathing room for the workers’ councils (soviets), the very possibility of a workers’ revolution would not have existed. Likewise, in the anti-fascist united front of the Second World War, if progressive forces had not utilized contradictions among the world powers, fascism could have destroyed a large part of human civilization.
Therefore, the decisive issue is not “dependence,” but intelligent use of the fissures of the global system without sliding into a proxy position.
At this juncture of toppling the Islamic Republic, Kurdistan—by virtue of its record and credibility in social organization and political struggle—can become a bastion of freedom: a space to step onto the ground of council-based self-administration and defend society against the violence of collapsing repressive forces.
Such a space can become a center of gravity for organizing social forces across Iran, where popular institutions, councils, and defensive structures form a concrete alternative to political power from below. The “Woman, Life, Freedom” charter opens a new horizon for this possibility. For today’s social and political forces in Iran, the question is not a choice between “isolation” and “dependence,” but the discovery of a path that combines reliance on the organized power of women in Kurdistan, the leadership of women across Iran and among the oppressed, and conscious use of the contradictions of the global system. Iran’s political destiny will not be determined in the rooms of global power, but in the organized struggle of those who are governed. On this path, Kurdistan is not the end of the road but the vanguard and bastion of transition toward emancipatory relations across Iran.
Yazar Notu:
In these decisive moments of the final collapse, amidst the ruins of the Islamic government’s instruments of oppression, Kurdistan is not merely a geography, but the ‘beating heart’ of change and a steadfast fortress of liberty.
In this power vacuum, where the enemy’s machinery of suppression has been razed to the ground, identifying the militant and organized forces in Kurdistan is a vital necessity for public awareness. This writing is an effort to understand the field deployment of forces that — regardless of their specific nature and strategies — bear the responsibility of steering society through chaos and participating in this historic transition, solely by virtue of their capacity for intervention, organization, and existing coordination.
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Abbas Mansour