Historical documents show that the secret Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916) between Britain, France, and Tsarist Russia, followed by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), consciously ignored the Kurdish question. This “fourfold partition” was not a solution to a historical problem but was instead an attempt to deny and erase the Kurdish question itself. The natural response to these conditions was a struggle against national oppression, which transformed the “right to self-determination” into the central axis of political movements across all parts of Kurdistan.

The British Project of a “Centralized Military State”

The developments of twentieth-century Iran were shaped by external state-building projects. After the February 1921 coup and the rise of Reza Khan, who was a Cossack officer, Britain advanced the consolidation of centralized state power by recognizing his authoritarian and militaristic potential. General Edmund Ironside, the commander of British forces in Iran, played a decisive role in guiding Reza Khan’s military ascent.

The strategy behind this policy was to create a national army and a centralized bureaucracy to secure imperial interests and contain Bolshevik influence. This process came at the expense of suppressing ethnic communities, including Kurds, Azerbaijanis, Sistan-Baluchis, Turkmens, and Arabs. With the proclamation of Reza Khan as king in 1925, which was supported by the Qom clergy under the doctrine that “the Shah is the shadow of God,” policies of cultural homogenization and structural marginalization in peripheral regions became institutionalized.

The Consolidation of Security Dictatorship

The second major turning point in the suppression of democracy and national rights was the 1953 coup against the national government of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh. This coup, which was organized with the direct involvement of the intelligence services of the United States (CIA) and Britain (MI6), consolidated the authoritarian rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. If the coup had failed and the Shah had been removed, the later rise of Khomeinism would likely not have been possible.

The coup was carried out under the military leadership of General Fazlollah Zahedi, who relied on hired street mobs and received political support from segments of the clergy. This included networks associated with Behbahani and Kashani, both of whom benefited from substantial financial backing. The result was a political deadlock that reinforced authoritarian rule.

A strategic consequence of this process was the intensification of security control in border and ethnic regions. The ethnic groups of Iran were not only deprived of political participation but were also relegated to a center-periphery order where their share of development became structural underdevelopment. Class oppression rooted in dependent, oil-based comprador capitalism merged with national oppression. This produced a form of internal colonialism characterized by the extraction of natural resources and the destruction of local ecosystems.

Administrative Divisions after the Rise of Political Islam in 1979

Central governments have historically attempted to weaken Kurdish regions through geographical fragmentation. After the 1979 revolution, the security logic of administrative divisions continued. Kurdish society was dispersed across four provinces:

Kurdistan Province
West Azerbaijan Province
Kermanshah Province
Ilam Province

This fragmentation prevented the formation of a unified administrative-political unit capable of advancing broad national demands. The presence of large Kurdish populations in northern Khorasan, specifically in Quchan, Shirvan, and surrounding areas, was also the result of forced relocations during earlier historical periods, particularly under the Safavid dynasty and Nader Shah Afshar.

These relocations aimed to use Kurds as a human defensive buffer along the borders while keeping them under the authority of local tribal chiefs and feudal lords. The underlying goal of this policy was to separate Kurds from their homeland and gradually assimilate them into the constructed identity of the Iranian nation.

Kurdish Political Parties in Iran

At present, Kurdish political organizations in Iran can broadly be categorized into three main tendencies:

Nationalist / independence-seeking currents
Autonomy-oriented or federalist movements
Leftist socialist movements—generally supporting the right of peoples to self-determination and advocating solidarity among the peoples of Iran and the region, often with a council-based (communal) orientation.

Many of these parties became active following the 1979 revolution, and several of them are currently based in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

Komala

Komala appeared in the late 1970s from networks of Kurdish student circles and leftist activists influenced by socialist ideas. From the outset, the organization sought to frame the Kurdish national question in connection with class struggle and the social emancipation of the working classes.

In the revolutionary atmosphere of 1979, these political networks established lasting ties with workers, artisans, and the urban and rural poor. Following the collapse of the monarchy, the organization publicly announced its existence in the winter of 1979 under the name Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan, or Komala, and quickly became one of the decisive political forces in Kurdistan.

During the early years following the revolution, Komala played a dual role. On one hand, it helped organize popular structures and local councils; on the other, it organized Peshmerga forces to defend areas under its influence. In Sanandaj, neighborhood councils known as Bankehs became some of the earliest examples of council-based grassroots organizations established after the revolution.

Only a few months after the rise of political Islam to power, in August 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a decree of jihad against Kurdistan, accompanied by widespread massacres. This marked the beginning of a new phase of popular resistance. Military operations by the army, revolutionary committees, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps intensified in order to recapture Kurdish cities and suppress political organizations. Under these conditions, Komala organized Peshmerga forces and resisted the offensive, maintaining control over several towns and many rural areas for months.

Kurdistan during this period also became a refuge and stronghold for radical political forces opposed to the government, forces that were being severely repressed in other parts of Iran. The eight-year war between the governments of Iran and Iraq also served as a mechanism to suppress and contain social movements, including women’s, student, and workers’ movements, as well as the struggles of the people across Iran, particularly in Kurdistan.

Komala’s activities were not limited to military resistance. The organization also played an important role in the formation of social institutions. Among these initiatives was the establishment of the Peasants’ Union, founded by Fouad Mostafa Soltani and beginning in Marivan, later expanding to other areas. These unions played a significant role in confronting the remnants of the feudal landlord–peasant system and in organizing impoverished farmers.

At the same time, a network of councils and social organizations emerged in Kurdish cities. The active participation of women in the political and military structures of Komala was a notable characteristic of this period. Starting in the early 1980s, women not only participated in political activities but also joined the armed struggle within Peshmerga units.

The Formation of the Communist Party of Iran and Splits within Komala

On 2 September 1983, Komala, together with several political circles and activists who had split from other socialist organizations across Iran, founded the Communist Party of Iran. Within this framework, Komala continued its activities under the name “Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran”, while maintaining its own internal organizational structure. From 1983 onward, its forces were based in border areas and later in bases within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

The War between Komala and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (1984–1988)
One of the most tragic chapters in the modern history of Iranian Kurdistan was the armed conflict between Komala and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) during the mid-1980s. In September 1984, the KDPI’s central committee declared a full-scale war against Komala.

Within Komala’s leadership, there were differing views. A dominant faction interpreted the conflict as a struggle over political and class hegemony, while another tendency argued that the primary focus should remain on the struggle against the Islamic Republic. Meanwhile, internal disputes within the KDPI also led to splits, producing factions known as the “Revolutionary Leadership” and the “Eighth Congress” group.

Eventually, in May 1988, Komala announced the end of the internal conflict, citing responsibility toward the Kurdish movement and the need to concentrate on the broader struggle against the Islamic Republic. This internal war left heavy consequences, including killings, deep social and political divisions, and waves of migration and dispersion among activists.

Split within the Communist Party of Iran – Komala

During the period of retreat and camp-based existence, internal disagreements within the Communist Party of Iran intensified. In November 1991, a group of party cadres formed a new organization called the Worker-Communist Party of Iran, while the remaining leadership continued under the same name, maintaining the Communist Party of Iran and its Kurdistan branch (Komala) in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

The Worker-Communist Party of Iran itself later experienced another split, leading to the formation of two separate parties:

• Worker-Communist Party of Iran – Hekmatist
• Hekmatist Party (Official Line)

Komala – Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan

From the late 2000s, disagreements over the assessment of Iran’s political situation, strategies of struggle, and the relationship between political activity, opposition alliances, and Peshmerga warfare led to the emergence of several factions using the historical name Komala. As a result, the name “Komala” became a shared legacy among multiple organizations with a common origin but divergent political paths.

Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan

With changes in the regional political environment and the establishment of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, strategic disagreements deepened. In 2000, a group of Komala leaders—including Abdullah Mohtadi, Omar Ilkhanizadeh, and Reza Kaabi—argued that the Communist Party’s framework no longer corresponded to the new political horizons in Iranian Kurdistan. They separated and established the Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan. In 2006, this organization adopted the name Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan and continued its activities with a social-democratic orientation.

Komala of Kurdistan Toilers

In 2008, following a violent internal dispute, another faction emerged under the name Komala of Kurdistan Toilers, led by Omar Ilkhanizadeh. After years of separate activity, this group joined the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan on 19 November 2022. However, the reunification proved short-lived. Disagreements resurfaced, and on 20 June 2023, a section of the cadres announced the failure of the unity process and declared the continuation of independent activity, appointing Reza Kaabi as secretary-general and Fariba Mohammadi as spokesperson.

Two Komalas and Two Communist Parties of Iran

Due to organizational and ideological disputes, another split occurred within the Communist Party of Iran in 2020, resulting in two separate parties with the same name. In both cases, the Kurdistan branch continued to operate under the historical name “Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran (Komala).”

On one side of this division stands the faction led by Ebrahim Alizadeh, who serves as Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Iran and leader of its Kurdistan organization. On the other side stands another Communist Party of Iran led by Salah Mazouji, whose Kurdistan branch also operates under the name Komala.

Both organizations currently maintain separate headquarters and bases in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. As a result, today, two parties, the Communist Party of Iran, and two organizations, Komala, exist within the political landscape of Iranian Kurdistan, each claiming to represent the legacy and historical tradition of the original Komala movement.

Council for Cooperation of Left and Communist Forces in Kurdistan

This council was established in 2022 during a conference in Stockholm with the aim of strengthening cooperation and coordination among communist and left-wing parties and activists in Kurdistan. Its declared objectives include supporting the struggles of workers, women, and other social movements in Kurdistan and opposing the Islamic Republic.

The long-term horizon of this cooperation is the creation of a left and socialist alternative based on council democracy and popular self-management, transferring the administration of society to councils of workers, laborers, and ordinary people rather than party rule. The cooperation involves the Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran (Komala), the Kurdistan Committee of the Worker-Communist Party of Iran – Hekmatist, and a number of left- and communist-activists.

Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)

The KDPI was founded in 1945, at the end of the Second World War, in the city of Mahabad under the leadership of Qazi Muhammad. The party emerged amid the presence of the Red Army in northern Iran and the establishment of the Azerbaijan People’s Government led by Ja’far Pishevari. With a Kurdish nationalist orientation, the party aimed to end national oppression against the Kurdish people.

During this period, the Republic of Kurdistan was proclaimed in Mahabad. However, following the withdrawal of the Soviet Red Army and the Shah’s military advance, both the Azerbaijani and Kurdish popular governments were left isolated. The central government seized this opportunity to crush both movements. As a result, Qazi Muhammad, Saif Qazi, and several leaders of the Mahabad Republic were executed by hanging in 1947 in Mahabad’s Chahar-Cheragh Square.

After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the KDPI entered a new and decisive phase under the leadership of Abdulrahman Ghassemlou, a prominent political figure and diplomat. The party adopted the strategic slogan “Democracy for Iran, Autonomy for Kurdistan.”

In 1989, during negotiations with representatives of the Islamic Republic in Vienna, Ghassemlou was assassinated. He had approached the negotiations with a peaceful outlook and optimism regarding the government’s promises of a political settlement, unaware that the talks had been organized as a trap. While secretly meeting with Iranian representatives—who were in fact a death squad—he was shot and killed in the negotiation room. The assassination delivered a severe shock to the party and the Kurdish movement.

After Ghassemlou’s death, the party reorganized under the leadership of Sadegh Sharafkandi. Sharafkandi was also assassinated by agents of the Islamic Republic in September 1992 at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin, while participating in a gathering of the Socialist International. The assassination led to one of the most historic judicial rulings in Europe, officially implicating senior Iranian officials—including Ali Khamenei—in extraterritorial political assassinations.

After approximately 16 years of internal division, the KDPI finally achieved reunification in summer 2022, when its two main factions merged into a single organization under the leadership of Mustafa Hijri. Today, the KDPI is one of the principal members of the Cooperation Center of Iranian Kurdistan Parties and part of the six-party coalition formed following the January 2026 PJAK initiative.

Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK)

The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) was founded in 2006 and has become one of the more militarily visible Kurdish organizations. Unlike the KDPI, which advocates autonomy within Iran, PAK openly calls for full independence and the creation of an independent Kurdish state, rejecting federal models for Iran as insufficient. The leader of the party is Hussein Yazdanpanah.

Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan

The Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan emerged with a national–religious orientation and, on 26 June 1980, entered the post-revolutionary political arena as a counterweight to the dominance of left currents and secular nationalist forces. It represented a response from a segment of the religious community that nevertheless drew a clear boundary against leftist worldviews, and it organized its forces under the slogan “Peshmerga and Muslim.” The organization’s founding role was primarily associated with Sheikh Jalal Hosseini; after him, leadership passed to his son Kak Baba Sheikh Hosseini. At the level of Iran’s opposition politics, Khabat has also maintained cooperation with the National Council of Resistance of Iran (Mojahedin-e Khalq).